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INTRODUCTION
If the gentlemen in power were really so intelligent and so
devoted to the public cause ... what a pretty government and
paternal utopia we should be able to construct!
-Peter Kropotkin
We do have to go back some time in history ... to find ex-
amples of societies without the state, that being the particular
burden of the contemporary world. And yet when we do,
... we almost never fail to find an extraordinary record of
stability and equilibrium that suggests ... that the human
animal without the patterns of state and the pillars of author-
ity, tends to peace not war, to self-regulation not chaos, to
cooperation not dissension ... to order not disarray.
-Kirkpatrick Sale
To suggest that the State in modern industrial societies is
less than benignly neutral is hardly startling. But to suggest that
the State and other forms of imposed authority be replaced by a
decentralized system of community-based cooperatives, as do
contemporary anarchists, undermines the dominant mode of
political organization and the number of vested interests within
it. A socio-political theory which purports to be a scheme for
social transformation invites charges of idealism and naivete.
Lay criticisms usually elaborate such points as international
interdependency, the imperatives of defense, nuclear energy,
public services beyond the competence of community and
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individual, and other grave concerns (Sale, 1980:467). These
are large problems, born of industrial society and attributable
in part to it. The intent of this essay, rather than addressing
these global problems, is much more modest.
Within sociology, critiques of anarchism are more likely
to be theoretical, centered specifically on (1) the notion that
social order cannot exist without inevitable structural inequities
(i.e., hierarchical organization); and generically upon (2) the
idea that the "scientific" constructions of modern sociology
do not lend themselves to the study of the local and the par-
ticular. This second dilemma is at the heart of wedding political
practice to social theory. Certainly, the "problem of order"
is an important and unresolved one. As concerns anarchism,
the popular image still corresponds to a "state" of anarchy as
the equivalent of chaos.
On the contrary, the community of communes (from
Buber) that is the good society of various libertarian schemes
presumes social order based on cooperation. The following dis-
cussion presents an examination of the theoretical tenet of
anarchism that social order can, indeed, be based upon free
cooperation vis-a-vis sociological conceptions of order. The
argument may be presented in three parts. Providing a framework
for "new forms of human relationships" requires a systematic
effort on the part of anarchist scholars. First, anarchism as
critique must show how the reified notion of State has under-
mined community life and cooperation; and further, to show
through scholarship and example, that without the State, order
will not dissolve into chaos. Thusvinstances of anarchistic social
order must complete the argument. Accusations of idealism can
only be countered with historical examples; criticisms concerning
a lack of rigor with theoretical synthesis.
A Note Concerning Sociology and Order
Within the discipline of sociology, a theory is likely to be
dismissed as unsound if construed as ideological (see Martin-
dale's [1960] treatment of conflict theory departing from
Marx). Ideology, in our discipline, is nothing if not perjorative.
By an interesting turn, however, sociological theorists have relied
heavily upon political schemes and philosophies for a resolution
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of the problem of order. Order rests either upon coercion (con-
flict theories), consensus (structural-functional theories) or upon
striking a balance between collective and individual advantages
(exchange theories or some such bifurcation) (Mennell, 1974:
117).
Supposing the notion of order could be exempt, for the
moment, from the question of ideological bias, the bases of
order from each perspective beg the question of the scholar's
own values. Consensus, and what constitutes consensus, is
hardly value-free. Neither are the ideas of coercion or the "dis-
tributive justice" precept underlying exchange theory. If su~h
values can be explicitly identified within the accepted body of
sociological theory, criticisms of anarchism as apolitical or anti-
political ideology ring hollow. This point bears elaboration.
Both the structural-functional model and the economic
exchange model assume a social structure based on merit that is
essentially just. Within the meritocracy, various inequities are not
necessary "evils" but inevitable necessities. Specific theories
based on these models, such as Davis and Moore's functional
theory of stratification and Homan's human exchange theory,
offer barely concealed rationales for the continuation of things-
as-they-are in an exercise of politicalization by omission.
Davis and Moore (1945) begin their controversial treatise
with the statement that no society is classless. They propose to
outline universal (ahistorical and transcultural) features of
stratification as a functional mechanism for insuring that the
best qualified reach the best position. Maintenance of the social
order, in their view, is an equitable process, and social inequality
is important to that social order. "Social inequality is ... an
unconsciously evolved device by which societies insure that the
most important positions are conscientiously filled by the most
qualified persons" (emphasis mine) (Davis and Moore, 1945:
243). Inequality is necessary, according to this view, due to
(1) dispersion of talent through a population; and (2) scarcity
in this pool of talent. Even though this pool of talent is limited,
qualified individuals must still be induced to strive for a higher
position by reaping greater economic rewards, prestige, and
consumer access to cultural diversions. These rewards become
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socially expected, and are therefore built into the demanding
position. Positions are imbued with functional importance,
then, on the basis of "greatest social good" and the time and
talent involved in training. By their use of the word "sacrifice,"
Davis and Moore highlight the altruism and inherent justness
of their scheme. Great industrial social orders continue to be
stratified not only due to the necessity of maintaining an in-
creasingly specialized society, but because the scheme is just:
those who invest more, get more.
In exchange theory, the competition of the marketplace,
and the notion of profit maximization, lie at the base of human
relations according to Homans (1961). Although Homans does
not deal directly with the issue of social order, his rules of ele-
mentary social behavior are those upon which order is based.
of the five formal propositions offered by Homans, the first
four come directly from operant pyschology (Hingers and
Willer, 1979; Miley, 1981 ).1 The final proposition has to do with
the law of distributive justice, or justice in the rewards and costs
between persons.
A man in an exchange relation with another will expect that
the rewards of each man be proportional to his costs-the
greater rewards, the greaters the costs-and that the net rewards,
or profits, of each man be proportional to his investments-the
greater the investments, the greater the profit (Homans, 1961:
75).
It follows that,
the more to a man's disadvantage the rule of distributive justice
fails of realization, the more likely he is to display the emo-
tio nal beha vior we call anger (1961:75).
Social order, then, is based upon reciprocity, or as Miley (1981)
has argued, "false reciprocity." That is, in the first part of
Homan's definition of distributive justice, rewards are "pro-
portional" to costs; in the second part, the notion of profit
and investment are introduced converting "a statement of the
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reciprocity norm into a statement about rational profit maxi-
maximixing" (Miley, 1981 :9). According to Homan's scheme"
we are all narrowly economic men and women. In the market-
place of social life, caveat emptor applies to all human relation-
ships.
In these "scientific" schemes, social order is contingent
upon either the distribution of goods and services based on a
paucity of talented and trained individuals hierarchically chan-
neled; or upon a tacit social contract between "buyer" and
"seller." The difference between these particular sociological
theories and anarchism is vast in many respects. But again, the
point to be made here is that all theory, in making assumptions
about the nature of human beings, is political. Mainstream
sociology attempts to treat social-structural abstractions (like
order and equality) as if theory was divorced from political
assumptions about the character of reality. Theories geared to
the maintenance and justification of the status quo somehow
have become anesthetized from social responsibility. Rarely,
if ever, is an attempt made to link theory and practice in an
effort to bring about a scheme for social transformation. In-
deed, theory and practice become translated as the "practice
of theory ," a rather sterile pursuit.
By contrast, anarchism in its various forms-individualist
anarchism, anarchosyndicalism, anarchocommunism, pacifist
anarchism (Woodcock, 1969)-offers a critique of existing social
structures, a scheme for social transformation, and finally, a
surprisingly consistent vision of the "good society,,,2 surprising
because of the .great diversity of revolutionary strategies and
economic organizations proposed within various schools of
anarchism. As a socio-political theory, it has been subject to a
great deal of perjorative analysis and gross misunderstanding;
as a pragmatic scheme, it has been made impotent by being
subsumed under an ideological umbrella of "radical" (Bookchin,
1978).
The history of anarchism as a movement is admittedly
uneven. Until quite recently anarchism as a body of acts and
attitudes had dwindled to practical insignificance. Now in the
process of re-emerging on the historical stage, it encompasses
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a number of movements closely identified with the counter-
culture of the sixties and heretofore seen as separate trends:
the imperatives of radical ecology (Bookchin, 1979: 177); the
cooperation of various intentional communities (Clark, 1981);
the organismic worldview of radical feminism (Kornegger,
1975).3 Anarchism for a time, to borrow a phrase, had retreated
to the sphere of the imagination although "it is no doubt better
to have imagination without a movement than a movement
without imagination" (Clark, 1981 :20). The basic formula-
tions from the classical period of anarchism provide the bases
of the contemporary anarchist synthesis. Anarchist social theory
questions whether a large-scale, centralized, mechanized system
can be the means to a more humane society. Its goals can be
stated simply: disappearance of the state, disappearance of
class rule, attainment of human equality and social manage-
ment of the economy (Clark, 1980:84-86). At the base of
anarchism is the ideal of communal individuality; restated,
human beings are social creatures whose distinctive personalities
(individualities) can best be nurtured in a strong community.
Social Order and Free Cooperation
Anarchist scholarship is contingent upon finding a neces-
sary balance between abstraction (generalizations) and the con-
crete (the "local and particular" mentioned earlier). Once a
theory is taken from the streets or factories and into the aca-
demy, there is the risk that revolutionary potential will be sub-
verted to scholarship (Bookchin, 1978:5); in other words,
knowledge becomes technology.
(G)eneralizations, valuable as they may be, are all too often
achieved by defining social life in highly formalized and abstract
terms. The 'laws' and categories derived by creating formal
typologies are often gained at the expense of insights that
the molecular ·structures provide and the challenging conclu-
sions they imply (Bookchin, 1978:16).
But there is no denying that the libertarian problematic has
survived as the result of scholarship and reissuing works by
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Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin and others. Contemporary
anarchist theory and practice departs from the premises of
the classical period, restating (rather than reformulating) the
basic precepts mentioned above.
Anarchism generically begins with the assumption that
patterns of domination-including classism, racism, sexism and
heterosexism-can be traced to the hierarchical imposition of
authority. The disappearance of the state and of class rule
fosters a commitment to radical egalitarianism. This raises the
central question of this analysis: Anarchy literally means no
government. Without government, there is the implication of
a lack of order, of chaos. If human sociability and cooperation
are suppressed by the State ["if we want to strengthen society
we must weaken the State" (Ward, 1973:20)], what then is to be
the basis for social order?
There are two answers to this question. The anarchist
theory of spontaneous order is situational and can be amply
illustrated without looking much further than current events.
The second, order based upon voluntary (free) cooperation
is more complex and departs from a formal theoretical critique
of the State. Taking the former first, the theory of spontaneous
order states that "given a common need, a collection of people
will ... by improvisation and -experiment, evolve order out of
the situation-this order being more durable and more closely
related to their needs than any kind of order external authority
could provide" (Ward, 1973:28). As Kropotkin wrote in The
Conquest ofBread,
Give the people a free hand, and in ten days the food service
will be conducted with admiral regularity.... Speak of the
organizing genius of the 'Great Misunderstood,' the people, to
those who have seen it in Paris in the days of the barricades,
or in London during the great dockers' strike, when half a
million of starving folk had to be fed, and they will tell you
how superior it is to the official ineptness of Bumbledom.... In
any case, a system which springs up spontaneously, under stress
of immediate need, will be infinitely preferable to anything in-
vented between four walls by hide-bound theorists (1972b :91).
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It is under stress "of immediate need" that the theory of
spontaneous order may be observed-in times of revolution,
natural disaster and "mass" events. When technology fails (as
in the complete blackout of New York City a few years ago)
and the rules of conduct are suspended; when thousands of
people came together for the Woodstock Music Festival over a
decade ago and peacefully coexisted; the theory ofspontaneous
order underlaid action taken. In such situations, individuals
become living presences in the execution of social policy and
action. These examples, while not isolated or difficult to sum-
mon, are characterized by their brevity. Traditional structure
(form) is absent or in disarray and social order takes on a dif-
ferent content. The order experienced and created by the par-
ticipants is situated in a fleeting social anti-structure.
Sustaining spontaneous social order based upon voluntary
cooperation requires a more lengthy recapitulation. Here, classi-
cal anarchists were fond of bringing to bear anthropological
evidence featuring stateless, preliterate tribes and in the zeal to
convince, mistaking the "tyranny of custom" for the spirit of
cooperation. For example, Kropotkin's search for an unartic-
ulated anarchism of the people led to over-generalizations about
"tribal solidarity" in "Mutual Aid Among Savages" (1902).
Archaic and historical evidence, while useful, leads back to that
argument that anarchism can only work in small, preindustrial-
ized, "primitive" groups. The statement belies an understanding
of the complexity of any human group, in any context, and of
anarchism itself. Indeed, anarchy is a function of a society's
complexity and multiplicity of social organizations (Ward,
1973:50). Kropotkin's Mutual Aid, while not exempt from the
charge of revisionist history and some misinterpretation, was an
early attempt to devise a typology of forms of social order based
on cooperation and emphasizing unity in diversity.
Briefly, according to Kropotkin's universal scheme, the
tribe or clan gave way to the village community, later replaced
by the medieval free city. He saw the free city, in its later form,
as an autonomous, decentralized State bearing little resemblance
to the modern State (Sale, 1980:462). These early social forms,
culminating in the diversity of the free city represented the
90
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possibility of a return to cooperative forms of social organiza-
tion.
Among early peoples, cooperation was based along blood
lines. When bonds of common descent were loosened, a new
form of cooperative life based on commonly-held land, the
"barbarian village," replaced the clan as the dominant form of
social organization (Kropotkin, 1972:170-175). In the 10th and
11th centuries, Europe was invaded by various warrior bands.
Kropotkin wrote that as town walls fortified villagers from
outside attack, so also did they symbolize inner fortification
against the rule of thousands of petty feudal lords. At this time,
the medieval city appears.
The medieval city was an attempt at organizing, on a much
grander scale than in a village community, a close union for
mutual aid and support, for consumption and production, and
for social life altogether, without imposing upon men the
fetters of the State, but giving full liberty of expression to the
creative genius of each separate group of individuals in art,
crafts, science, commerce and political organization (Kropot-
kin, 1972:188).
The final point of Kropotkin's historical analysis is that
the State, as comprised of dominant minorities and subordinant
majorities, is "but one of the forms of social life" (1972:132)
and certainly not the "highest" form. It was his contention that
the State was built on the annihilation of free union. This last
point leads logically to a more formal anarchist critique regard-
ing cooperation, order, and the State extrapolated from Kropot-
kin. As mentioned earlier, it is necessary to first show that the
State has undermined cooperative life before presenting any
proofs regarding social order based on cooperation.
The Anarchist as Critic: Society vs. the State
The assumptions of anarchist theory regarding cooperation
vis-a-vis the State can be ordered as follows:
1. Voluntary cooperation is engendered within the community.
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Community can be defined in territorial and cultural
terms, both material and ideational, where people are
united by common values, interests, ideas, myths, rituals,
symbols and artifacts. It is further a matter of degree-
the extent to which people share interests, values and
objects of cultural/emotional attachment.
Union, or solidarity, comes about by virture of emo-
tional attachment to the community and by adherence
to certain internalized rules.
Cooperation can be defined as the interdependence be-
tween altruism (welfare of the community) and in-
dividual needs and wants.
2. The community is responsible for the provision of public
goods.
Public goods are those "good(s) which (have) the pro-
perty that, if any amount of the good is provided, any
member of the public in question can benefit from it
whether or not he contributed to its provision" (Taylor,
1976:3).
3. The prOVISIon of public goods is dependent upon size: the
larger the community, the less likely is voluntary cooperation
in the provision of goods:
The smaller the community, the greater the ease of
facilitating public sanctions and censures resolved by
the community as opposed to institutional censure im-
posed by outside authority (police, military, codified
norms of laws, etc.),
4. The intervention of the State in small communities, providing
a framework for rapid growth and assimilating or destroying
smaller communities, exacerbates the conditions claimed to
justify its existence (i.e., people will not voluntarily cooperate;
problems of security for persons and property).
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5. By virtue of assimilation, the State thus undermines the req-
uisites of Community as a territorial and affective state, upon
which cooperation is based.
This scheme is a lengthy recapitulation of Kropotkin's simple
statement quoted above. From here anarchist theory and practice
departs. If the basis of the theory is order from cooperation,
the theory is predicated upon the destructive role of the State.
It becomes clear that anarchist theory and anarchist order
presuppose a certain kind of society. Beginning with the first
point, community as a cultural and territorial union cemented
by the solidarity of values, myth, ritual, and so forth, necessi-
tates examination of the "good" society and social order within
it.
Libertarian practice has historically taken two forms: those
who have conceived of the problem in terms of an initial class
struggle, and those with a multi-dimensional, cultural orientation
(Clark, 1981 :23). In the United States, the former can be traced
to nineteenth century immigrant movements and the revolu-
tionary syndicalism of the IWW. These movements, which pin-
pointed capitalism and the State as the roots of domination,
were based largely on anarchosyndicalism and revolutionary
syndicalism. In this type of anarchism the workers are organized
to overthrow the State through insurrection or economic class
action (Clark, 1981:23).
The second form, with which anarchocommunism is most
closely associated and which will be examined here, has been
implemented in various intentional communities (Kropotkin's
agro-industrial communes). From the nineteenth century to the
present, communitarian living arrangements have provided ex-
amples of the attempt to move towards voluntary cooperation,
direct social participation, decentralization and egalitarianism.
From the myriad of communal groups that flourished during
the nineteenth centruy (see Noyes, 1966; Nordhoff, 1965), to
the countercultural communes of the sixties, to the present
"back to the land" move toward voluntary simplicity, the
"libertarian problematic" has been expressed in direct action
(Clark, 1981).4
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There is a rich literature and tradition of intentional com-
munities of the past two centuries in the United States. In the
encyclopedic listings of historical communities (for e.g., Fo-
garty, 1980) the sheer number of communities that flourished
for a short time and then floundered are staggering. Moreover,
in the nineteenth century as in the twentieth, anarchist thought
percolates through the lifespan of a community but only a
few cooperatives identified themselves as such (notably Home,
Washington, and the Ferrer Colony at Stelton, New Jersey).
Many of the nineteenth century efforts which blended utopian
socialism with anarchistic elements were doomed to failure.
And some more recent anarchist groups have interpreted anar-
chist theory as a series of slogans. In failing to provide alterna-
tive institutional and organizational forms, these communities
were also doomed. Taking as an example the Ferrer Colony,
the concept of community in the anarchist sense can be ex-
amined less abstractly:
1. "Voluntary cooperation IS engendered within the com-
munity."
The Ferrer Colony and Modern School, an alternative com-
munity and institution, lasted nearly four decades and cannot, of
course, be chronicled in great detail here. Very briefly, the Ferrer
Modern School and Association was established in New York
City October 13,1911 (Veysey, 1973:81). As a result of political
upheavals and discord within the association itself, the decision
was .made t.o build .a rural community around the school. The
school as a libertarian institution acted as a cohesive force,
uniting a diverse group of individuals. A farm was purchased
in 1914 at Stelton, New Jersey. The Ferrer organization pur-
chased 143 acres at $100 per acre. Individual plots were resold
to colonists at $150 an acre in lots of one to two acres each
(1973: 116). There was no formal governance; colonists were
free to come and go and visitors were encouraged. In the first
years of hardship, . a mood of solidarity was reported by an
anonymous colonist,
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We have no greedy employers, no submissive workers, no
wages, no hours,-we have artists expressing themselves joy-
fully .... Members here do not discuss questions of solidarity,
brotherhood and mutual aid-they go right ahead and practice
them (quoted in Veysey, 1973:119).
2. "The community is responsible for the provision of public
goods."
At Ferrer, the colonists either commuted to jobs in nearby New
York or attempted to raise poultry and vegetables on their
individual garden plots. The colony was never completely self-
sustaining, but for fifteen years, a local cooperative helped
colonists satisfy their needs at fair prices (Veysey, 1973:129).
Despite an inability to be completely self-sufficient, the com-
munity was economically viable.
3. "The provision of public goods is dependent upon size."
Within six or seven years, The Ferrer Colony was a success.
From 1916 to the middle 1920s, the school and colony grew
continuously. "By September, 1918, fifty-one dwellings existed
in the colony, and about twenty families lived there year-around.
The summer population was then estimated at 200" (Veysey,
1973:121). At its peak, Stelton contained about one hundred
families in the winter months and twice as many in the summer.
"By 1922, some eighty or ninety houses had been built in the
colony; this was to be about the peak number" (Veysey,
1973:121). At its peak, Stelton contained about one hundred
families in the winter months and twice as many in the summer.
"By 1922, some eighty or ninety houses had been built in the
colony; this was to be about the peak number" (Veysey, 1973:
122).
The Ferrer community was not immune to internal dis-
putes and factions which seemed to intensify during the late
1920s. However, its final demise as a community took place
during the second World War when the u.S. Army built barracks
on the property adjacent to that owned by Steltori residents.
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With the building of Camp Kilmer in 1941, the prOXImIty to
several thousand soldiers "produced an atmosphere of theft,
vandalism, and ... rape" (Veysey, 1973:172). Many older
residents sold their homes and moved. The community failed to
reproduce itself and entered a period of decline. It is, however,
ironic that what may have been an inevitable demise was has-
tened by external (statist) intervention.
Social Anti-Structure and Anarchistic Social Order
This brief sketch of the Ferrer Colony illustrates what
Bookchin has called the reconstruction of revolutionary theory
and practice. As a community, it represented a "movement
towards cell-tissue society in a physical sense" and an attempt
to abolish domination and hierarchy in all forms (1978:20). To
move towards cell-tissue society is to put principles into action,
as did the Ferrer colonists. In the context of the anarchist col-
lective, the objective is not to recruit (add) members but to
reproduce (multiply) the collective. As mentioned, Ferrer failed
to reproduce itself, but for several decades it maintained an
optimum size with a diverse population. There was no need to
recruit members or students for the school, and an open door
policy meant colonists could sell their land and leave the com-
munity fully reimbursed. The population was constantly chang-
ing.
Although there was leadership at Ferrer, it represented
an attempt to abolish domination and hierarchy in all forms.
Community meetings were held on a regular basis. By all reports,
they were quite lively and even heated at times. This kind of
direct democracy is, of course, contingent on size. The anarchist
collective, because of the commitment to egalitarianism is of
necessity small. "The size of a collective is essentially a limita-
tion of its authority" (the anti-mass, 1979:343-344). Within the
small community, emerging inequalities can be immediately
dealt with and more readily identified. The anarchist's reliance
on the individual gives each man and woman' choice and ulti-
mately, responsibility for maintenance of an equitable, cooper-
ative system. Indeed, as Bookchin writes,
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there is no way to immunize any social formation, even the
most dedicated anarchist groups, from hierarchical relations
except through the wisdom of 'self-consciousness' that comes
from the 'self-actualization' of the individual's potential for
self-hood (Bookchin, 1979:9).
(This is Bookchin's rather pedantic way of saying that we all
have our shortcomings.) The abrogation of responsibility for
social maintenance to individuals may prove to be a heavy bur-
den, and raises a third point.
In the intentional community, with group production and
consumption entered freely by its members, each member has
an equal voice. Each member must also assume responsibility
for work to be done, which was not a problem at Ferrer as long
as it was a community (in the affective sense). Buildings were
erected, gardens were planted, leaving time for the enjoyable
pursuits of swimming, lectures and other community-produced
entertainments. Still, Ferrer is no longer in existence. With few
notable exceptions, the intentional community appears to be
relatively short-lived. Why?
It is essential to this analysis to examine a key problem
with anarchistic social order in practice, perhaps all too obvious
to the reader by now. Anarchistic social order, based on volun-
tary cooperation (with the emphasis on "voluntary"), assumes
non-coercive reciprocity in human relationships. It assumes,
further, a reciprocity based upon human bonds; a reciprocity
that defies externally imposed social structure. Let me return
to a point made earlier-that the order arising "under stress of
immediate need" is situated in a fleeting social anti-structure.
This condition has been described by the anthropologist Victor
Turner as "communitas." Communitas is an immediate, genuine
human bond; "the bonds of communitas are undifferentiated,
egalitarian, direct, extant, nonrational, existential" (Turner
and Turner, 1978:250). Characterized by spontaneity, breaking
in "through the interstices of structure ... and from beneath
structure" (Turner, 1969:127), attempts to sustain order based
on anti-structure (communitas) are frequently disappointing.
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In such moments of experienced communitas, "self has the
mystical experience of unity with others in an egalitarian sense;
the self becomes more collectively human" (O'Donnell and
Hartung, 1982:13). So enters the mystical element with anar-
chism, difficult to reconcile with the more rational theoretical
propositions outlined earlier. Difficult, but not impossible.
One needs to ask oneself whether the rational and mystical are,
indeed, dichotomous states or if this is not another obstacle
thrown up by "hide-bound theorists" as defying empirical
reality.
CONCLUSIONS
In summary, anarchistic social order, arising spontaneously
to meet each unique situation and based upon cooperation, does
not correspond to the sociological conceptions of order based
on consensus, coercion, or distributive "justice." The anarchist
is suspicious of artificial consensus imposed by external regulat-
ing agencies. Society, defined by human sociality, is not homo-
genous but comprised of diverse individuals. And while the
anarchist does not deny the coercion implicit in this codified
social order, anarchists are deeply suspicious of any revolutionary
government as well. Aside from this, the "revolution" does not
appear imminent. As mentioned, the closest corresponding soci-
ological conception of order is the notion of noncoercive re-
ciprocity, stripped of economic overtones and founded on essen-
tial human -bonds. From this it follows the anarchist assumes
that. human beings, if not. essentially "good," are essentially
social. Thus, the importance of community in defining individ-
uality. So much for theoretical abstractions.
What is often neglected in a theoretical scheme is the
cultural dimension, so important in translating a theory into
practice. Anarchism, as mentioned earlier, is a function of a
society's complexity. Both capitalism and socialism in practice,
based historically on unlimited growth, have simplified "social
life to the level of the inorganic" (Bookchin, 1978:16). As the
environment is denuded and social life increasingly fragmented,
a response has been forthcoming. There is an unoccupied social
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donlain left untouched by a massive bureaucratic system. This
domain is being filled by cooperatives, neighborhood associations
and various other groups created in response to social ills (Book-
chin, 1979 :28). This incipient movement, congenial to the
American tradition, has a great radicalizing potential; potential
that may never by actualized on a "mass" scale but valuable
for this very reason. Anarchism operates rather like communitas,
slipping in and out of the interstices of social groups and social
structure. Anarchism as theory offers a viable critique of the
homogenizing, destructive role of hegemony in all its forms.
And anarchism as practice is remarkably prolific and adaptable.
FOOTNOTES
1. That Homans does not really separate animal from human behavior
has endeared him to evolutionary or social biologists. Not surprisingly,
maximizing one's own gain is very much akin to "maximizing reproduc-
tive fitness" (see Alexander, 1979).
2. Several scholars, notably historians Woodcock (1969) and Jo11 (1964),
have commented on the uneasy fit of "rational" anarchist theory with
the ascetic, almost mystical tendencies of many of its proponents.
Indicative of this is the appellation given Kropotkin during his life-
time, that of the movement's "secular saint."
3. One would be remiss in neglecting to mention that the re-emergence
of anarchist theory encompasses not only movements identified with
the Left, but Libertarianism as well. It is arguable, however, whether
libertarian practice corresponds to the Libertarian "platform" of the
1980s; or whether the communal individuality of anarchism corre-
sponds to uninformed individualism.
4. These two forms have been expressed in somewhat different terms by
Ritter (1980:151). In the first instance, some particularly significant
social activity is rearranged leaving other structures undisturbed (i.e.,
education, worker self-management). In the second, all activities are
transformed in a circumscribed place, usually rural, in some kind of
community setting. Ritter argues) and I would agree, that many inten-
tional communities in the sixties were implicitly anarchistic. A few,
such as Morningstar Ranch in California, explicitly acknowledged
of understood their anarchist heritage.
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